The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax Preference by Mehrotra, Ajay K. & Ott, Julia C.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 6 Article 6 
2016 
The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax Preference 
Ajay K. Mehrotra 
American Bar Foundation 
Julia C. Ott 
The New School for Social Research. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ajay K. Mehrotra and Julia C. Ott, The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax Preference, 84 
Fordham L. Rev. 2517 (2016). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss6/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2517 
THE CURIOUS BEGINNINGS OF THE 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX PREFERENCE 
Ajay K. Mehrotra* & Julia C. Ott** 
 
Despite the importance of the capital gains tax preference, and the 
controversy it often evokes, there has been relatively little serious scholarly 
attention paid to the historical development of this highly significant tax 
provision.  This Article seeks to move beyond the normative and presentist 
concerns for or against the tax preference to recount the empirical 
beginnings and early twentieth-century development of this important tax 
law.  In exploring the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax 
preference, this brief Article has several aims.  First, its main goal is to 
show that the preference is not a timeless or transhistorical concept, but 
rather a historically contingent one—a concept that has been shaped not 
purely by economic logic, but rather by political compromise and social 
experience.  Second, it uses the capital gains tax preference to shed light on 
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different 
guiding principles of American political economy.  Third, by examining the 
shifting political coalitions and constituencies behind the tax preference, it 
intends to show that it is not simply wealthy and elite American taxpayers 
and their representatives who have supported this tax law.  Rather, over 
time, the law has had a variety of proponents, suggesting that the 
provision’s persistence can be explained as much by political forces and 
institutional inertia as by seemingly inexorable economic reasoning.  
Ultimately, an exploration of the beginnings and early twentieth-century 
development of the capital gains tax preference provides an opportunity to 
think about how “we are what we tax.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of 
Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka.1  The Court held that gains 
derived from the one-time sale of property constituted taxable income.2  
Writing for the Court, Justice John H. Clarke maintained that the legal 
definition of taxable income historically had included gains from the sale of 
investment property or capital assets, and the recently adopted Sixteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution3 simply ratified that longstanding 
interpretation.4 
For Clarke, the legal issue was straightforward.  “In determining the 
definition of the word ‘income’ thus arrived at, this Court has consistently 
refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists and 
has approved, in the definitions quoted,” wrote Clark, “what it believed to 
be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in 
the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”5  By including capital gains in the income tax base, the Court 
ensured that wealthy Americans, who owned most of the country’s capital 
assets, were paying their fair share of the new income tax. 
Although the Court’s decision seemed to settle the constitutional question 
of whether capital gains were included in the tax base, determining the tax 
rates that applied to such gains remained an open question.  Within the 
same year, Congress addressed this secondary question.  The 1921 Revenue 
Act included a provision that taxed capital gains at 12.5 percent, well below 
the top marginal rate of 65 percent for ordinary individual income at the 
time.6  Thus, the new law created the first preferential rate for capital gains.  
Since then, the Internal Revenue Code has almost always contained a 
capital gains tax preference in one form or another.7 
 
 1. 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
 2. Id. at 520–21. 
 3. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 4. Merchants’ Loan & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. at 519. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233. 
 7. To be more precise, the current Internal Revenue Code taxes individual “net long-
term capital gain” at a lower rate than “ordinary income” or “net short-term capital gain.” 
See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1(h), 1221, 1222 (2012).  This preference was 
repealed for a short period during the late 1980s as part of the landmark 1986 Tax Reform 
Act. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301, 302, 311, 100 Stat. 2085, 
2215–20. 
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Given the increasing concerns over rising inequality in the United 
States,8 the social implications of the tax code and the preferential treatment 
of capital gains recently have captured the attention of many everyday 
Americans.  In a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, 61 percent of Americans 
admit they are “bother[ed] a lot” by the idea that “some wealthy people 
fail[] to pay their fair share.”9  Among registered Republicans, 45 percent 
admitted they felt the same.10  The recent surge in such sentiments can be 
traced to a number of factors including the revelation in 2012 that 
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s tax bill totaled only 14.1 
percent of his income.11  Romney managed this because he received most 
of his income in the form of returns on his investments.12  Romney’s capital 
gains were taxed more lightly than his “earned” income received in the 
form of salary. 
The specific tax treatment of capital gains also has drawn the attention of 
both parties’ presidential candidates.  Leading Democratic contenders have 
challenged the structure of the preference for capital gains.  Bernie Sanders 
demands the federal government “[t]ax capital gains and dividends the same 
as work,” eliminating the preference to achieve equity between “earned” 
income from wages and salaries and “unearned” income from capital.13  
Hillary Clinton has pledged to “raise” rates on capital gains by stretching 
out the amount of time that an individual must hold an investment before 
they qualify for the full preferential rate.14  For Clinton, lengthening this 
holding period would mitigate against the short-term oriented quarterly 
capitalism that she claims has wreaked havoc on the U.S. economy.  While 
Republicans uphold the preference and call for further cuts in capital gains 
taxes, 2016 presidential candidates Donald Trump and Jeb Bush both 
identified the carried interest exemption—whereby fund managers may 
classify their fees as investment income to qualify for the lower capital 
gains tax rate—as a fundamentally unfair loophole that they would close.15 
 
 8. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the 
United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON., 1, 1–34 (2003). 
 9. Federal Tax System Seen in Need of Overhaul, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.people-press.org/2015/03/19/federal-tax-system-seen-in-need-of-overhaul/ 
[https://perma.cc/NDR2-4MWE]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Associated Press, Romney’s 2011 Tax Rate 14.1%, Return Shows, NEWSDAY (Sept. 
21, 2012, 10:19 PM), http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/romney-s-2011-tax-rate-14-1-
return-shows-1.4027336 [https://perma.cc/573R-VV5Q]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Ten Fair Ways to Reduce the Deficit and Create Jobs, BERNIE SANDERS:  U.S. 
SENATOR VT., http://www.sanders.senate.gov/top10 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/PGN5-ULK3]; see also JONATHAN TASINI, THE ESSENTIAL BERNIE 
SANDERS AND HIS VISION FOR AMERICA 13 (2015). 
 14. Laura Meckler, Hillary Clinton Proposes Sharp Raise in Some Capital-Gains Tax 
Rates, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2015, 6:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/clinton-to-
propose-rise-in-capital-gains-taxes-on-short-term-investments-1437747732 [https://perma. 
cc/4H8D-TBST]. 
 15. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11–15 (2008); Katy Osborn, This Is the Tax Loophole Obama, 
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Why does the federal tax code privilege income from capital gains?  How 
has this preference persisted for nearly one hundred years through 
numerous permutations of federal economic policy and countless changes 
to the federal income tax code?  Indeed, ever since 1921, when our tax laws 
first established the capital gains tax preference, commentators and scholars 
alike have analyzed the justifications for this tax preference.16  While some 
have decried it as an inefficient and unnecessary benefit for wealthy 
taxpayers,17 others have supported it as a much-needed provision to 
facilitate the free flow of capital.18 
It is not only wealthy taxpayers and their representatives who have 
supported this feature of federal income tax law.  For nearly one hundred 
years, policymakers across the political spectrum have maintained the 
preference for capital gains income as a much-needed provision to 
encourage and to reward property ownership among everyday citizens.  In 
addition, organized groups hailing from the financial industries have 
doggedly opposed any proposed increase in the capital gains tax rate and 
persistently demanded its reduction, even calling for the abolition of any 
taxation on capital gains.  As early as the 1930s, these groups developed a 
new language of “incentives” and “venture capital” and deployed particular 
models of how financial markets influence the real economy.19  They 
managed to exploit fissures—and in many cases widen them—within both 
 
Bush, and Trump All Want to Close, TIME MONEY (Sept. 16, 2015), http:// 
time.com/money/4036087/tax-loophole-carried-interest [https://perma.cc/G6JL-B65Q]. 
 16. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money:  American Attitudes 
Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 165 (1994) (“The equitable side of the 
capital gains debate reflects not only views on the nature of wealth distribution but on the 
nature of America.”); Charles L. B. Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 26 TEX. L. REV. 440, 460 (1948) (“As far as showing ability 
to pay an income tax and their economic nature are concerned, there is not the slightest basis 
for any distinction between a capital gain and any other form of income.”); Peter Miller, The 
“Capital Asset” Concept:  A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 838 
(1950) (“Assuming that the federal income tax should treat like transactions alike, the special 
treatment accorded capital gains can be justified only if the transactions giving rise to such 
gains have characteristics which set them apart from transactions resulting in ordinary 
income.”); Lester B. Snyder, Taxation with an Attitude:  Can We Rationalize the Distinction 
Between “Earned” and “Unearned” Income?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 241, 244 (1998) (examining 
“why we tax income from capital investment differently than income form services,” 
including the historical origins of taxing investment and earned income differently). 
 17. See, e.g., Lowndes, supra note 16, at 440 (“Stripped of the bogus economic theology 
which has been cunningly employed to conceal their true origin and character, the capital 
gain and loss provisions of the federal income tax are a shrewd and cynical device for 
frustrating the progressive principle of the tax and shifting its burden from those best to 
those least able to bear it.”). 
 18. See, e.g., GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 98-473-E, INDIVIDUAL 
CAPITAL GAINS INCOME:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1998) (concluding that cutting the tax rate 
on capital gains income would reduce “lock-in” on capital gain assets); Daniel N. Shaviro, 
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 415 (1993) (concluding that, while there 
are some inequalities in the tax preference, “a revenue-raising capital gains tax preference 
probably is better than no tax preference. . . .  [A] revenue-raising preference probably 
increases efficiency”). 
 19. See, e.g., David Carris, Comment, Capital Gains Taxation:  A Full Circle?, 14 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 45 (1989) (citing Morris S. Tremaine, The Capital Gains Tax, 15 
TAXES 517, 567 (1937)); see also infra Part II. 
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the Republican and Democratic parties.  The preference for capital gains, 
long embodied in the tax code, thus has been shaped not purely by 
economic logic or class bias, but rather by political coalition making and 
social experience. 
Despite the importance of the capital gains tax preference—and the 
controversy it often evokes—there has been relatively little serious 
scholarly attention paid to the historical development of this highly 
significant tax provision.  Besides several studies that have used the origins 
of the tax benefit as a preface to an analysis of the existing conventional 
justifications for the preference,20 only a few notable scholars have delved 
into what the historical origin of this tax law means for the structures of 
risk, wealth, and opportunity.21  Building on these latter studies, this Article 
seeks to move beyond the normative and presentist concerns for or against 
the preference to recount the empirical beginnings and early twentieth-
century development of this important tax law. 
In exploring the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax preference, 
this brief Article has several aims.  First, its main goal is to show that the 
preference is not a timeless or transhistorical concept, but rather a 
historically contingent one—a concept that has been shaped not purely by 
economic logic, but rather by political compromise and social experience.  
In fact, chronicling the early history of the tax preference may be one way 
to show the historically bounded nature of tax policy.  By examining 
particular critical junctures in the path-dependent development of the 
preference, this Article intends to demonstrate how the preference has 
endured because of changing political and social conditions. 
A critical history of the ideas and beliefs that undergird existing tax laws 
and policies also reminds us that the development of legal and economic 
theory is not simply a linear accretion of knowledge.  Rather, the theories 
that support the capital gains preference are the product of shifting ideas 
and beliefs not only about economic growth, but also about the meaning of 
risk, wealth, and opportunity in modern American capitalism.  This Article 
seeks to build upon some of the recent literature on the intellectual history 
of the economics discipline and its relationship to American law and 
capitalist development to tell a more nuanced and complicated story about 
 
 20. For some examples of scholarship on the capital gains tax that has paid only passing, 
if any, attention to its history, see Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for 
a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993); Arthur P. Hall, Fifty Years of the 
Federal Capital Gains Tax Burden, 67 TAX NOTES 553 (1995); Van Mayhall, Capital Gains 
Taxation—The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REV. 81 (1980); Richard L. Schmalbeck, 
The Uneasy Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax:  Why Not the Second Best?, 48 TAX 
NOTES 195 (1990). 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS 
REDUCTIONS OF 1973, reprinted in THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY:  A TAX ANALYSTS 
READER 219 (J. Andrew Hoerner ed., 1992); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital 
Gains Taxation:  What’s Law Got to Do With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 917 (1985); Kornhauser, 
supra note 16, at 151–54; William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 153, 154–61 (1983). 
2522 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
the origins and early development of our current capital gains tax 
preference.22 
Second, this Article uses the capital gains tax preference to shed light on 
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different 
guiding principles of American political economy.  More specifically, it 
seeks to challenge the conventional historical wisdom that Keynesian 
economic thinking dominated the post-World War II period only to give 
way to the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s and afterward.  Instead, 
this Article claims that elements of both economic theories have been 
operating in tandem throughout the twentieth century and that one set of 
ideas has been at the forefront during particular historical periods because 
of changing political and social context. 
Third, by examining the shifting political coalitions and constituencies 
behind the tax preference, this Article intends to show that it is not simply 
wealthy and elite American taxpayers and their representatives who have 
supported this tax law.  Rather, over time, the law has had a variety of 
proponents, suggesting that the provision’s persistence can be explained as 
much by political forces and institutional inertia as by seemingly inexorable 
economic reasoning. 
In chronicling the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax preference, 
this Article analyzes two distinct historical periods.  Part I begins with the 
formative era of our modern income tax regime to see how the ideas and 
actions of economic theorists and lawmakers influenced the adoption of the 
preference.  The initial impulse behind preferential tax treatment for capital 
gains emerged from concerns about stimulating, protecting, and rewarding 
property ownership (whether in farms, homes, or financial investments) in 
the tumultuous years following World War I.  It was during this period that 
the preference first became embedded in American tax law. 
Part II explores the New Deal Order of the 1930s and 40s, when financial 
institutions like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE or “the Exchange”) 
began to stress the importance of economic incentives and the need either to 
maintain the preference or eliminate capital gains taxation all together.  
Faced with rising capital gains tax rates under President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, the NYSE and its academic and corporate allies united with 
select southern Democrats to secure the reduction of capital gains taxes in 
1938 and 1941.  These broader political, social, and institutional forces had 
a significant impact on the development of the tax preference. 
Finally, this Article concludes with a brief assessment of how our 
historical analysis of the first half of the twentieth century can inform our 
present understanding of the capital gains tax preference.  Indeed, an 
exploration of the beginnings and early twentieth-century development of 
 
 22. For a sampling of some of this literature, see generally MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A 
PERILOUS PROGRESS:  ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
(2001); HOWARD BRICK, TRANSCENDING CAPITALISM:  VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY IN 
MODERN AMERICAN THOUGHT (2006); ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION:  
REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION (2012); PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT 
THAN LIGHT:  ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL PHYSICS, PHYSICS AS NATURE’S ECONOMICS (1989). 
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the preference provides an opportunity to think about how “we are what we 
tax”—the theme of this law review symposium.  This topic allows us to use 
a specific legal rule as a point of departure to analyze bigger questions 
about the causes and consequences of epistemic shifts and economic 
transformations.  In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, which 
generally assumes that capitalist relations and arrangements are “natural” 
and inevitable, a historical approach to the study of American capitalism in 
general, and the capital gains tax in particular, questions these assumptions.  
It interrogates critically what is frequently presumed to be an inexorable 
part of everyday life.23 
I.  1920S BEGINNINGS 
At the turn of the twentieth century, when the conceptual foundations of 
our current income tax system were first being debated, many of the details 
of our modern system of direct and progressive taxation were still relatively 
uncertain.  Although the United States adopted an income tax during the 
Civil War and again in 1894, neither of those measures contained a 
preference for capital gains.24  In fact, the 1894 tax was quickly struck 
down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional in 1895.25  The Court’s 
decision triggered a social movement that eventually concluded with the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.26  Thus, when Congress 
began considering a new income tax law in that same year, it was operating 
with a relatively blank slate.  Eventually, the 1913 income tax established 
general parameters of relatively high exemption levels and moderately low 
rates, but lawmakers were cautious in burdening the new law with too many 
complicated distinctions. 
Powerful lawmakers counseled that because the 1913 income tax was an 
innovation, it was wise to defer until later the creation of distinctions like 
differing rates for different types of income.  “[L]ike any new tax law,” 
Tennessee Congressman Cordell Hull, one of the chief architects of the 
income tax, noted, “it will be necessary for the people to become acquainted 
with the proposed law and for it to become adjusted to the country before 
extending its classifications, abatements, deductions, exemptions, and so 
forth.”27 
To be sure, some economic theorists and lawmakers had been advocating 
for specific classifications of income well before the income tax became 
law.  Decades earlier, University of Michigan political economist Henry 
Carter Adams argued that a truly progressive tax system ought to segregate 
 
 23. See Sven Beckert, History of American Capitalism, in AMERICAN HISTORY NOW 314, 
315 (Eric Foner & Lisa McGirr eds., 2011). 
 24. Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 416 (1894); Charlotte 
Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding:  The Machinery of Institutional 
Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 367 (1994). 
 25. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–84 (1895). 
 26. See JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 22–56 (Robert 
E. Burke & Frank Friedel eds., 1985). 
 27. 50 CONG. REC. 499, 508 (1913) (statement of Rep. Hull). 
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income based on its source.28  Adams and others believed that labor income 
truly was “earned” from the sweat of the worker’s brow, while income from 
capital represented the “unearned” returns from the accumulated wealth of 
the idle rich.29  Accordingly, different sources of income ought to be taxed 
differently. 
In fact, countries like England were already using a schedule-based 
income tax that made distinctions between different types of income.30  Yet, 
as Congressman Hull explained, the United States was not quite yet ready 
for such sophisticated distinctions.  “[W]hile the bill should contain the 
essential features of a modernized income-tax law,” stated Hull, “no attempt 
should be made to write into it the comprehensive system of rates such as is 
found in other countries, like England.”31 
It did not take long, however, for the country to take on such a 
comprehensive system of rates.  With the onset of World War I and U.S. 
participation in the conflict, marginal income tax rates quickly skyrocketed 
and exemption levels declined.32  While the 1913 income tax affected only 
about 2 percent of households,33 by 1919 at the height of the war, nearly 20 
percent of American households paid income taxes.  Meanwhile, World 
War I bond drives set in motion an increase in the number of American 
households that invested in financial securities.34  As a result, the income 
tax and the sale of bonds both became dominant sources of wartime public 
revenues, and many more Americans became acquainted with a levy that 
was no longer so novel. 
Although World War I tax laws introduced many complicated elements 
into the tax code, including steeply progressive marginal rates, there was no 
preference for capital gains.35  That did not arise until soon after the war.  
Faced with a mild post-war recession, and prevailing high marginal rates, 
business leaders and economic commentators protested that the elevated 
wartime rates were no longer necessary.  In fact, many argued that the 
wartime legacy of high rates was preventing a return to “normalcy” and 
“industrial prosperity.”36  A sharp but short-lived recession and growing 
labor and racial unrest compelled political leaders to search for ways to 
 
 28. HENRY CARTER ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF FINANCE:  AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC REVENUES 332–35 (1899). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Meade Emory, The Early English Income Tax:  A Heritage for the 
Contemporary, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 286, 295 (1965); A Tax to Beat Napoleon, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES:  HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/ 
http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis1.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
5T8B-NKZR]. 
 31. See supra note 27. 
 32. War Revenue Act, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (1917). 
 33. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE:  LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 7 n.14 (2013). 
 34. JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET:  THE QUEST FOR AN 
INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 2 (2011). 
 35. STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 49–82 
(2008). 
 36. 61 CONG. REC. 5135 (1921). 
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revive the economy and return the country to a sense of normality.37  It was 
in this political and economic context that Congress first began considering 
a tax preference for capital gains. 
When Congress began drafting and debating the first post-war tax bill, 
one of the dominant aims was to find ways to relieve taxpayers of high tax 
burdens while stimulating commercial activity.  “The reduction of the tax 
burdens,” noted the House Ways and Means Committee, “is essential to 
business recovery.”38  Some business and political leaders believed that 
with the end of the war, the federal government could disband the wartime 
tax state and return to a system of more regressive and indirect taxation.  
Indeed, some even called for the adoption of a national sales tax to replace 
the income tax.39  Other groups, including organized farmers and laborers, 
contended that the success of the wartime revenue laws signaled the need to 
maintain and perhaps even strengthen the progressive income tax.40  It was 
amidst this political contestation that lawmakers forged a compromise:  
retain the progressive income tax, albeit at much lower rates, and allow a 
preferential tax rate for capital gains. 
Many lawmakers and business leaders believed that the high marginal tax 
rates were preventing individuals and businesses from selling appreciated 
investments.  A taxpayer “would refrain from making a sale of land or other 
property constituting capital assets because he would have to pay so large a 
proportion to the Government,” reported Congressman William R. Green.41  
“It would so increase his income taxes that he would not make the sale.”42  
Fiscal conservatives, including the then-recently appointed Treasury 
Secretary Andrew Mellon, also complained that the high marginal income 
tax rates were encouraging wealthy taxpayers to avoid taxes by investing in 
tax-free municipal and state bonds.43  These public investments, Mellon and 
others argued, starved private enterprise of funds and allowed subnational 
governments to indulge in extravagant public projects.44 
The specific idea to separate investment gains from ordinary income 
seems to have originated with Fredrick R. Kellogg, a leading corporate 
lawyer.  Testifying before Congress in 1920 and 1921, Kellogg appeared 
more the practical expert than the interest-group puppet, more moderate, 
more flexible, and, at times, even obsequious compared to the other, rather 
 
 37. See Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 871–73. 
 38. Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Goverance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1159, 1169 (2004) (citing H.R. 350 (1921)). 
 39. See Excess Profits Tax or Sales Tax?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1920, at 1, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C03E1DB143AEE32A25753C3A96 
39C946195D6CF [https://perma.cc/89KS-RE6C]; see also MEHROTRA, supra note 33, at 
376–83. 
 40. See generally ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY:  ORGANIZATIONAL 
INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1925 
(1997); ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM:  FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE, 1877–1917 (1999). 
 41. 61 CONG. REC. 5289 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green). 
 42. Id. 
 43. MEHROTRA, supra note 33, at 396–98. 
 44. Id. 
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strident witnesses.  In his testimony, Kellogg shifted the subject from 
taxpayers to transactions.45  He agreed that high rates yielded less 
revenue—a notion that long predates Arthur Laffer’s infamous curve—but 
not because the wealthy sheltered their funds.  Rather, all Americans 
refrained from transacting in the face of high income taxes.46 
Kellogg supported his views with anecdotal examples of how numerous 
Americans from all walks of life were refraining from taking part in 
economically productive transactions because of high tax rates.  At the 
1921 hearings, legislators swapped stories with Kellogg, stories of 
frustrated and beleaguered individual investors:  a homeowner who 
swallowed a loss when relocation forced him to move; a “thrifty” worker 
who might be compelled to sell his “little home” if laid off; a farmer unable 
to exit in response to the agricultural crisis because he could not afford the 
tax liability; and the stockholder who “would not sell at the top of the 
market because of this tax law” and then watched helplessly as share prices 
plummeted.47 
Frustrated investors could be found in all classes.  Aborted transactions 
robbed the Treasury of revenue.  Taken together, these forsaken 
transactions pointed to a different diagnosis for the postwar recession.  
Capital had not been diverted, but “frozen.”  In Kellogg’s model, the 
relative freedom of capital to flow in a “fluid” fashion in and out of 
different enterprises and to assume varied forms determined the state of the 
economy.48  “There can be no question, I think, as to the harm,” noted 
Kellogg, “during a period of enormous demand for fluid capital for many 
reconstruction purposes . . . money [is] enchained in existing forms of 
investment.”49  Kellogg’s single capital market held in motion all assets. 
In defending his proposal, Kellogg articulated many of the rationales that 
defenders of the capital gains preference would repeat down to the present 
day.  Unless granted a preferential rate, Kellogg claimed, capital gains taxes 
unfairly burdened the average property owner, who might realize one large 
gain in his lifetime only to see it eaten up by the government when that 
windfall bumped him into a higher income tax bracket in the year of sale.50  
Income from capital gains also deserved preferential treatment because 
inflation reduced the real value of capital gains, even before taxes were 
paid. 
To counter these potential disincentives, Congress adopted section 206 of 
the Revenue Act of 192151 (or “the 1921 Act”)—the first iteration of the 
capital gains tax preference.  The new provision limited the taxation of “net 
capital gains” to 12.5 percent, well below the top marginal rate of 65 
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percent on ordinary income.52  Influential leaders in the Treasury 
Department and Congress agreed that a lower tax rate on capital gains 
would not only unlock the existing impediment taxpayers felt, but would 
also potentially increase total tax revenue.  The new provision, opined 
Congressman Green, “will reduce the rates in many instances which people 
will pay on sales of real estate and in some instances on sales of personal 
property that are capital assets, but it is quite certain that it will bring about 
sales which otherwise would not occur.”53  As a result, Green and others 
believed, total revenue would likely increase.  “It has been the opinion of all 
of the experts of the Treasury,” Green concluded, “that the ultimate 
working out of this would bring more revenue into the Treasury.”54 
By 1921, the receipt of “unearned” investment income no longer seemed 
as plutocratic as it once did.  American political culture had long coupled 
property ownership and citizenship, but World War I bond drives expanded 
the concept of property to encompass financial securities and championed 
the ideal of a mass investment society.  In contrast with Henry Carter 
Adams’s day,55 the receipt of “unearned” investment income no longer 
seemed as risk free, given postwar inflation, depression, plummeting stock 
prices, and the long-term sectoral shift away from agriculture. 
Yet what is perhaps most interesting about the 1921 origins of the capital 
gains tax preference is how the present-day justifications for the tax benefit 
were also there at its beginnings.  Arguments about “unlocking” the free 
flow of capital were the dominant rationale, just as they are today.  
Likewise, levying a lower rate to compensate for the unfair “bunching” of 
income that had occurred over the course of many years was articulated 
back in the 1920s and also is used today.  Such is the case with claims about 
inflation eroding nominal capital gains.  And so too is the notion that it is 
not only wealthy elites, but all property-owning Americans, who suffer 
from high tax rates on the gains from the sale of capital assets. 
The 1921 Revenue Act enacted the first capital gains tax preference, but 
it was the 1924 law that explicitly revived a distinction between “earned” 
and “unearned” income.56  Back in the late nineteenth century, economic 
theorists like Henry Carter Adams questioned whether different types of 
income ought to be taxed differently.  In his pioneering 1898 public finance 
treatise, Adams explained why he believed that all sources of income were 
not the same:  “[T]he difficulty of obtaining the correct statement of 
income,” wrote Adams, was aggravated by “the great variety of forms in 
which incomes exist.”57  During a simpler age, lawmakers could be more 
confident that “incomes [sh]ould be homogeneous” and that a given tax 
would lead to “the same treatment applicable to all.”58  But in the more 
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modern age of industrial capitalism, “in society as it exists,” wrote Adams 
in 1898, “incomes are not homogeneous.  They do not reflect the same 
industrial conditions or measure with accuracy the energy expended to 
secure them.”59 
Adams elaborated on the distinct types of income.  A cleavage existed for 
him between “[i]ncome from service[s],” by which he meant “wages, 
salaries, professional fees,” and “income[] from property,” which included 
the returns from capital investments.60  For Adams, each income source was 
accompanied by different economic and social conditions and hence 
entailed different tax treatment.  Because income from services (e.g., wages 
and salaries) was “both terminal and uncertain,” while income from 
property (e.g., interest, dividends, and capital gains) is “by comparison 
considered as perpetual and certain,” the difference warranted “a distinction 
in the law of taxation by which income from property is rated higher than 
income from effort.”61 
Although Adams’s ideas did not initially gain traction as part of the 1913 
income tax, it did not take long for some prominent policymakers to take 
notice.  By the time Congress began considering a new tax bill in 1924, the 
economy seemed to be back on track, and Republicans had securely seized 
the powers of national lawmaking.  This seemed to be an odd time for 
lawmakers to consider a tax preference for “earned income.”  Yet that is 
precisely what occurred.  Secretary Mellon, one of the richest men in the 
world, began to popularize the idea of a lower tax rate for wages and salary 
income—of course, he knew full well that given existing exemption levels, 
it was not the everyday worker, but rather elite professionals who would 
benefit from such a preference for labor income. 
In his highly popular and influential 1921 book, Taxation:  The People’s 
Business,62 Mellon made the economic case for the tax preference for labor 
income.  “The fairness of taxing more lightly incomes from wages, salaries 
and professional services than the incomes from business or from 
investments is beyond question,” wrote Mellon.63  Labor income “is 
uncertain and limited in duration; sickness or death destroys it and old age 
diminishes it.”64  By contrast, for the capitalist, “the source of income 
continues; the income may be disposed of during a man’s life and it 
descends to his heirs.”65  Because the tax code already had provided a lower 
rate for capital gains, it was only fair, or so the argument was made, that a 
tax benefit also be granted to labor income. 
Mellon’s calls for an “earned” income tax preference soon became 
enacted as part of the 1924 revenue law.66  The first $10,000 of income 
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above exemptions levels was eligible to be categorized as earned income 
entitled to the lower tax rate of 12.5 percent.67  Although the legislative 
history apparently was not as rich as it was for the 1921 Act and its 
adoption of the capital gains preference, economic commentators noted the 
significance of the new tax benefit for earned income.  Writing in the 
American Economic Review, University of Minnesota political economist 
Roy Blakey acknowledged that this new tax benefit was a true innovation.68  
“Previous federal revenue acts made no differentiation in favor of ‘earned’ 
income,” wrote Blakey.69 
Yet Blakey also underscored that because the income tax as a whole was 
still an elite tax that affected only the country’s wealthiest earners, the tax 
benefit was rather limited.  “Though differentiation in favor or ‘earned’ 
income is desirable,” wrote Blakey, “it would be much more important if 
exemptions were lower.”70  Blakey elaborated on the broader context of the 
existing U.S. tax system to illustrate that there were other areas where 
differentiation was occurring, including state and local property taxes, 
estate and inheritance taxes, and federal excise taxes.71 
By the time the 1920s came to a close, the capital gains tax preference 
seemed to be securely ensconced in the Internal Revenue Code.  Although 
there were still several business leaders who wanted to abolish all capital 
gains from the income tax base, there were relatively few who believed that 
capital gains ought to be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.  Indeed, 
if anything, there were some commentators who wanted to tax all sources of 
income, including labor income, as little as possible.72 
Arguments about the need for capital mobility and fairness seemed to 
win the day.  The preference was required not only to mitigate against the 
“lock-in” effect of holding appreciated investment assets, but also because 
the “bunching” of income over time meant that a onetime gain at sale or 
disposition exaggerated the tax liability.  Equally compelling was the 
argument that inflation was overstating the real economic gain that came 
from holding and selling capital assets.  Thus, from its beginnings, the 
capital gains tax preference has been undergirded by a variety of rationales 
and justifications—many of which are still made today.73 
Yet many of these claims turned on empirical assumptions that were 
often difficult to sustain.  For example, it was always presumed—without 
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much objective evidence—that the lower tax rate on capital gains led to 
greater tax revenue from the increased sale of capital assets.  Similarly, 
business leaders like Kellogg were convinced that the preference could help 
all everyday property owners, not just the wealthy who owned most of the 
country’s capital assets at the time.  Finally, the juxtaposition of a tax 
preference for capital gains alongside a somewhat similar benefit for 
“earned” or labor income suggested that neither lawmakers nor economic 
experts were quite clear about which source of income—capital or labor—
would be more responsive to changing tax rates. 
The practical uncertainties did not, however, prevent advocates of the 
capital gains tax preference from continuing their support.  As the country 
faced a new economic crisis in the 1930s, the voices for capital continued to 
press the case for a capital gains tax preference.  And this time they blamed 
the crisis itself on the inability of capital to flow freely.  President 
Roosevelt and his New Deal responded to the Great Depression in a variety 
of ways, including using the tax code as an occasional cudgel against the 
rich and wealthy “economic royalists.”74 
II.  THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL ORDER 
When tax receipts plummeted during the Great Depression, Congress 
raised rates on top incomes and capital gains.  In 1933, Senate hearings led 
by the fiery prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora revealed that some of the 
wealthiest Americans had avoided paying any income tax by deducting 
their capital losses against their ordinary income.75  Among those who 
faced Pecora’s wrath, no one was more famous than John Peirpont Morgan, 
Jr.  Pecora revealed how the losses sustained by Morgan and his partners 
due to the market crash wiped out all of their income tax liability in 1931 
and 1932.76  Because lawmakers presumed that the rich traded more 
frequently, the Revenue Act of 1934 raised rates on capital gains for short-
term investments, along with rates on the highest earned incomes. 
Recently routed in its efforts to defeat New Deal securities regulation, the 
NYSE—the self-proclaimed “Citadel of Conservatism”—rallied for a new 
fight:  the elimination of the capital gains tax.  NYSE president Richard 
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Whitney blamed the Great Depression on the very existence of a capital 
gains tax.  Together with the National Industrial Recovery Act77 and the 
National Labor Relations Act,78 capital gains taxes now presented the chief 
impediments to economic recovery.  Whitney emphatically stated that 
recovery must come in the future as it came in the past:  through the work 
of private enterprises, the intelligence of their management, and the courage 
of private capital when it is incentivized by tax preferences.79 
Whitney used the word “incentives” in a novel manner.  Earlier in the 
twentieth century, scientific managers and behavioral psychologists had 
used incentive to refer to a prompt or nudge, deliberately designed by an 
expert to elicit a desired behavioral response from an individual when the 
status quo circumstances—instinct, habit, or even the market—would tend 
toward a decision or an outcome that the expert deemed undesirable for that 
individual and/or for society at large.80  The meaning of incentive moved 
much closer to present-day usage in the Exchange’s challenge to capital 
gains taxation.  No expert need decide what was best for capital, or the best 
use of capital.  The notion of “incentives” articulated by NYSE leaders 
lacked the coercive or paternalistic aspect of progressives’ usage.  Portrayed 
as individual investors of modest means, capital voiced its preferred 
incentive through NYSE spokesmen—or so they claimed. 
Reduction or elimination of capital gains taxes would spur investors to 
trade, the NYSE maintained, setting in motion the “circulation” of “frozen” 
or “stagnant” capital.  This incentive would harness, not circumvent, the 
innate American instinct of entrepreneurialism.  More trading meant more 
investment, more new businesses, more innovation, more and better and 
cheaper goods and services, more jobs, more productivity, less inflation, 
and more growth.  Ultimately, the Exchange spokesmen promised, the 
Treasury would collect more revenue from the larger economy.81 
More gains for the investor meant more revenue for the government.  But 
“incentives” insinuated something more than just an even exchange.  
“Incentives” now hinted at variable, potentially unlimited upsides for all 
parties, similar to its neoliberal usage (think stock-based compensation a.k.a 
“incentive pay”).  The characterization of capital gains tax reductions as 
something like a Pareto-optimal trade disguised the policy’s likely effects:  
the upward redistribution of wealth, the enhancement of the economic 
freedom for some, and the concealment of structural constraints 
experienced by others. 
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The NYSE’s decades-long campaign against capital gains taxes forged a 
new meaning for “incentive”—a model of human motivation much closer 
to the one with which we live today.  The Exchange reconciled “incentives” 
with “markets,” as in present neoliberal usage, where incentives prompt 
individuals to enter markets to secure optimal outcomes for themselves and 
for society at large (think the 401(k) match).  The new meaning of 
“incentives” would provide the core principle for supply-side marginal tax 
cuts.82  “Incentives” spilled out of the arena of tax policy into debates over 
social policy, environmental policy, educational policy, and more.83  Today 
incentives appear everywhere as an obvious, noncoercive method for 
eliciting desired behaviors.84 
As we have seen, the Exchange integrated its demand for the reduction or 
removal of capital gains taxes into a broader rejection of the still-evolving 
tenets of the New Deal.  The Exchange reasserted its pro-investment theory 
of political economy, which dated back to Woodrow Wilson’s election.  
The Exchange’s ideology of “shareholder democracy” included three core 
tenets85:  First, broad-based share ownership reconciled democracy and 
industrial capitalism.  Second, shareholders’ interests warranted 
prioritization by lawmakers and by corporate managers.  Third, economic 
resources and risk were best distributed when securitized (i.e., turned into 
stocks and bonds) and traded on privately administered markets, 
unhampered by taxation or state-based regulation.86 
The double-dip “Roosevelt Recession” that hit in 1937 prodded new 
audiences to entertain the NYSE’s pro-investment theories and its tax 
policy recommendations.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and economist 
Irving Fisher took up the cause of capital gains tax and the language of 
incentives.  Invitations poured into Exchange leaders’ offices from a wide 
range of business associations, particularly ones located in the South and 
West.  NYSE president Charles Gay warned them that stimulating 
consumers’ income ahead of productive facilities—as proto-Keynesians 
close to the President had advised—would not produce or maintain 
prosperity.87  Instead, enterprises needed new and enlarged “productive 
facilities.”88  That would require businesses to raise “new 
capital . . . through the issuance of stock and bonds.”89  And that, in turn, 
required the NYSE to maintain “a continuously liquid security market,” 
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which it could not do until the “deadening hand” of capital gains taxation 
released its grasp.90 
In Congress, some southern Democrats came to the table with northern 
Republicans to listen more closely to opponents of the capital gains tax.  In 
November 1937, the House Ways and Means Committee took up a bill to 
abolish taxes on capital gains.  President Roosevelt threatened a veto.91  
“Desirable as it is to foster business recovery,” the President scolded, “we 
should not do so by creating injustices in the tax system, particularly 
injustices at the expense of the man who earns his income—injustices to the 
advantage of the man who does not.”92  Senator Vanderberg (R-MI) 
responded, “I shall not yield to the President’s demand for a tax on thrift 
and prudence, which is at least partially responsible for today’s chaos.  I 
prefer the route which leads to recovery as chartered by Senate Democrats 
and Republicans alike,”93 i.e., the abolition of capital gains taxes 
recommended by the NYSE.  Vanderberg and coauthor Senator Josiah W. 
Bailey (D-NC) released their “Conservative Manifesto” a mere month 
later.94  Business organizations, including NYSE brokerages, circulated two 
million copies.  The reduction of capital gains taxes stood at the top of their 
list of demands. 
With the Revenue Act of 1938,95 the tax code’s preference for unearned 
income actually increased in the midst of the Great Depression.  In the 
decades that followed, both the NYSE and southern Democrats pushed for 
further capital gains tax relief (in 1953, for example, Congressman Hale 
Boggs introduced a capital gains tax reduction bill named “the Revenue 
Incentives Act”96).  The top maximum rate of taxation on capital gains 
bottomed out in 1942 at 25 percent—where it would remain until 1967 
(efforts were made to reduce it even further)—even as taxes on ordinary 
(earned) income rose to 91 percent for the top bracket.97  Remarkably, the 
capital gains preference widened during a period marked by rising real 
wages and diminishing inequality. 
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World War II sparked fierce debate over federal taxation.  Congress 
transformed the income tax into a mass tax and raised marginal rates on 
earned—or what we would call today, ordinary—income.  But the Revenue 
Act of 194298 (introduced by Rep. Patrick Boland, D-PA) simultaneously 
lowered taxes on capital gains in an effort to encourage private capital to 
invest in economic activity that could support the war effort.  Lawmakers 
adopted the logic of the NYSE, expressed here by President Emil Schram, 
the former Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation: 
[L]owering of the capital gains tax will free equity capital, and by so 
doing will not only help to shift a portion of the financing of the defense 
effort from government to private capital but also to increase the revenue 
derived from the capital gains tax itself.99 
At the time, rates destroyed incentives and rendered “venture capital 
impotent,”100 Schram surmised, introducing another neoliberal keyword 
into American political discourse.  Testifying in favor of the Boland bill, 
leaders of the American Taxpayer’s Association and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce echoed Schram’s sentiments and adopted the Exchange’s 
language of incentives, diminishing returns, and venture capital.101 
The nation’s need to maximize production for an unprecedented global 
war gave rise to new experiments in government ownership of plant and 
infrastructure, much to the distress of many business and financial leaders.  
War bond speeches delivered and broadcast by NYSE representatives 
stressed the importance of preserving “our American way of life, which 
revolves around the system of initiative and enterprise” after the war.102  
Most alarming was the significance of the socialist trend represented by the 
$10 billion of property used for war production that was operated by private 
corporations but owned by the federal government through the Defense 
Plant Corporation103 (DPC). 
NYSE president Emil Schram articulated a postwar economic 
reconversion plan that included the privatization of all DPC facilities, as 
well as steep tax reductions.  Taken together, the two reforms would 
provide private enterprise with the required incentives to ramp up both 
production and employment, rendering full employment legislation 
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unnecessary.104  Stumping for southern Democrats like Texas Congressman 
Hatton Summers—who led opposition to President Roosevelt’s plan to 
“pack” the Supreme Court back in 1937—Schram sought to educate the 
audience on the capital gain tax’s destructive effects on venture capital.105  
Schram also advised against the prospect of new taxes to support social 
programs, warning that Americans were learning to depend too much on 
Washington.106 
Launching an institutional advertising campaign in 1946, the NYSE 
sought to educate the public on the key “requirements” for postwar 
economic reconversion and recovery.  The Exchange understood the 
ongoing battle to preserve—and even expand—the capital gains preference 
as just one front in its larger war against the “regimented form of security” 
that was introduced by the New Deal and that threatened to extend its reach 
after the war.107 
CONCLUSION 
By the end of World War II, the capital gains tax preference had become 
an entrenched part of the Internal Revenue Code.  Although the detailed 
mechanics of the provision continued to change throughout the century, 
with the preference even disappearing for a short time in the late 1980s, the 
concept of taxing gains from the sale of capital assets at a lower rate seemed 
to have become a natural and accepted part of U.S. tax law.  Consequently, 
the preference has taken on an air of economic determinacy and logical 
inevitability. 
The persistence and durability of the capital gains tax preference, 
however, is not the result of any inexorable or transhistorical logic.  Rather, 
the origins and early development of the preference are rooted in changing 
social, political, and economic contexts.  Adopted soon after World War I, 
when marginal tax rates were at historic highs, the preference initially was 
justified as a necessary incentive for the free flow of capital and as a fair 
way to tax gains that had accumulated over time. 
Still, even then, economic experts and policymakers were not convinced 
that investment returns were the only type of income responsive to 
changing tax rates.  For soon after the preference was enacted, Congress 
also created a lower tax rate for labor income.  The simultaneous existence 
of these two tax preferences suggests that there is hardly anything natural, 
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neutral, or necessary about the capital gains tax preference.  Indeed, the 
enactment of a tax preference for labor income, however fleeting, suggests 
a fiscal path not taken—one that illuminates the contingency of current 
policy and the possibilities for variation and reform. 
A critical history of the capital gains tax preference also demonstrates 
how economic and political elites have framed the supposedly widespread 
benefits of the preference.  Using a new idiom of “incentives” and “venture 
capital,” economic leaders in the 1930s depicted the capital gains tax 
preference as something that is available and enjoyed by all property 
owners across the socioeconomic spectrum, when empirically it was the 
wealthy elite who owned most of the country’s capital assets.  Similarly, 
lawmakers and policy analysts also deployed the language and logic of 
neoclassical economics to suggest the potential long-term benefits of tax 
cuts.  Many advocates of the capital gains tax preference have contended 
that lower tax rates on capital gains would always and everywhere lead to 
increased tax revenue, even though there was little objective, empirical 
evidence to support that theory. 
Ultimately, this story about the origins and early development of the 
capital gains tax preference is intended to provide a historical glimpse at tax 
law and policy that often is analyzed in ahistorical terms.  For a symposium 
focused on “we are what we tax,” an examination of the curious beginnings 
of the capital gains tax preference can teach us a great deal about how a 
seemingly innocuous tax provision—one that frequently has been assumed 
to be an organic and preordained part of our tax code—reflects changing 
conceptions of risk, wealth, and opportunity in the United States. 
